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On the Use of Masking Models for Image
and Audio Watermarking
Arnaud Robert and Justin Picard
Abstract—In most watermarking systems, masking models, in-
herited from data compression algorithms, are used to preserve fi-
delity by controlling the perceived distortion resulting from adding
the watermark to the original signal. So far, little attention has
been paid to the consequences of using such models on a key de-
sign parameter: the robustness of the watermark to intentional
attacks. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that by consid-
ering fidelity alone, key information on the location and strength
of the watermark may become available to an attacker; the latter
can exploit such knowledge to build an effective mask attack. First,
defining a theoretical framework in which analytical expressions
for masking and watermarking are laid, a relation between the
decrease of the detection statistic and the introduced perceptual
distortion is found for the mask attack. The latter is compared to
the Wiener filter attack. Then, considering masking models widely
used in watermarking, experiments on both simulated and real
data (audio and images) demonstrate how knowledge on the mask
enables to greatly reduce the detection statistic, even for small per-
ceptual distortion costs. The critical tradeoff between robustness
and distortion is further discussed, and conclusions on the use of
masking models in watermarking drawn.
Index Terms—Attacks, mask attack, masking models, robust-
ness, watermarking, Wiener attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL watermarking techniques are used to embed animperceptible and generally encoded/encrypted message,
the watermark, into a host content—digital data (audio, image,
video). Watermarking may serve different purposes such as data
hiding, copyright protection, integrity check and so on.
A. Background
In its own context, watermarking can be regarded as seeking
the best tradeoff between three critical design parameters: ro-
bustness, fidelity and capacity. Robustness measures the water-
mark’s ability to resist malicious or unintentional attacks in the
scope of the considered watermarking application. Fidelity is an
essential property of watermarking systems; it asserts how per-
ceptually similar the watermarked and original content are. Fi-
delity can be evaluated using a measure of distance between the
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original and watermarked content; although the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) is often used, it is known to be a rather poor in-
dicator of fidelity. Transparency implicitly means that the fi-
delity constraint was successfully attained. Finally, capacity (or
payload) reflects the number of useful information embedded
into the original signal—from a single bit when determining
the presence (or absence) of a watermark to many bits when
conveying a more complex message such as an identification
number or the ASCII transcryption of a web site address. This
paper specifically addresses the relationship between the two
parameters, fidelity and robustness.
The most successful step toward minimizing the perceived
distortion in watermarking was the adaptation of masking
models at the embedding process—those utilized in data com-
pression to shape the quantization noise in agreement with
perceptual findings on human hearing and visual systems.
Masking models determine the intensity level required, as a
function of time or frequency, for a signal to be perceived in
presence of other stimuli—and thus determine which intensity
levels are not perceived. This function is represented by a set of
values referred to as the mask; the latter is usually computed over
successive segments of data. For example, in JPEG compression,
the image is divided into 8 8 pixel blocks and the mask is
computed independently for each block. The mask then either
modulates the watermark to ensure it is not perceived [1], [14],
[17], or serves to increase the watermark’s energy for a given
fidelity constraint by allowing maximal imperceptible signal
energy to be embedded. Masking models have been essential to
ensure one property of watermarks: transparency. But by having
given priority to fidelity, little attention has been paid to the
potential vulnerability of mask-shaped watermarks to attacks.
Robustness, or detection performance, of watermarking tech-
niques has become increasingly important as more copyright ap-
plications were foreseen. Attacks on suggested techniques have
been popular and have become increasingly sophisticated over
the past few years. In particular, the estimate-and-remove class
of attacks has gained momentum: the watermark is estimated
and then subtracted from the watermarked signal. Early work
can be found in [9]. More recently, the Wiener filter has been
successfully implemented [8], [13], [15]; it assumes that the em-
bedded watermark has a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with
an estimated standard deviation.
B. Scope of the Paper
Several watermarking schemes use masking models to shape
a white spectrum message in order to guarantee the watermark’s
transparency. The scope of this paper is to determine and quan-
tify how, using knowledge on the masking model, one can de-
1520-9210/$20.00 © 2005 IEEE
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TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THE TEXT
rive a new estimate and remove attack, hereafter referred to as
the mask attack. The starting point is finding an analytical rela-
tion between the masking model and the robustness of the wa-
termarking system.
C. Outline
A description of the masking models used in this study is found
at Appendix. The first section of this paper provides an analytical
form for a generic masking model and an additive watermarking
scheme. Studying the relation between the decrease in detection
statistic and the introduced perceptual distortion, in the defined
framework, the mask attack is derived. A comparison with the
Wiener filter attack is made and results of theoretical simulations
given to formalize the theoretical behavior of the attack. Next,
experimental results on real sounds and images illustrate the
effectiveness of the attack. Finally, a discussion on the tradeoff
between robustness and distortion is addressed, and conclusions
on the use of masking models in watermarking drawn.
II. THE MASK ATTACK—THEORY
This section introduces a theoretical framework for an addi-
tive watermarking scheme which makes use of a masking model
to shape the watermark. Studying the relation between percep-
tual distortion and robustness, the mask attack is derived. The
latter is compared to the Wiener attack; while both attacks are
based on the estimation and further subtraction of the estimates
watermark given a perceptual distortion constraint, they differ
with respect to the knowledge that is utilized: the Wiener at-
tack makes an assumption on the global statistics of the water-
mark while the mask attack assumes knowledge on the mask
and therefore local characteristics of the watermarked signal.
The assumptions needed to derive the mask attack will prove
correct in Section III, where experimental results are given.
A. The Model
Before defining the embedding and detection processes and
the utilized measure of perceptual distortion, let us introduce in
Table I the notation of, and the assumptions on, the signals and
entities used in this study. Each signal is represented as a vector
(a matrix can be re-written as a vector).
The host signal is the original content (audio sample, image).
The message is a sequence of bits of information to be conveyed
by the watermark; it could be a series of random numbers, an op-
timal coding sequence, etc. The watermark is the shaped mes-
sage that is ultimately added to the host signal. Each data vector,
in the considered transform domain, has a total length . Each
vector is decomposed in subvectors (blocks) of length
for processing purposes; considering the masking models used
in this paper (see Appendix), a block corresponds to an 8 8
pixel matrix for images and samples corresponding to a dura-
tion of 20 ms for sounds. A Gaussian distribution of mean and
variance is denoted as . The notation indicates
that each dimension of is multiplied by the corresponding di-
mension of : .
Embedding. The watermark embedding process is described
by the following relations:
In order to be able to derive theoretical results, three hypotheses
on the signals are made, as follows:
(1)
The mask gives the maximum allowed perceptual distortion
for each coefficient; it is used to modulate the message, , such
that . Since the distribution of the mask can not be
described in a closedform, the hypothesis of a Gaussian distribu-
tion was adopted. Observations show that, in general, the distri-
bution of mask values can be better approximated by a mixture
of Gaussians, as illustrated at Fig. 1.
The distribution of the mask values for two DCT coefficients
(normalized to the standard deviation of the corresponding DCT
coefficient, i.e., divided by ), is shown in Fig. 2 for the ref-
erence image “Girl”. Coefficients indexed (4,4) and (4,7), with
computed mean and standard deviation of ,
and , are shown on the left and
right side of the figure, respectively. Mask values greater than
1.5 are spread over a long interval and are not shown; they rep-
resent only a small fraction of the overall distribution, although
they can indeed be very useful to the attacker. It appears from the
computed data that the Gaussian hypothesis is adequate; it is fur-
ther validated in Section III where empirical results are given. It
is worth noting that this hypothesis is not stronger than the widely
accepted Gaussian distribution approximation for the DCT coef-
ficients of an image—which vary much locally in a given image.
Detection. The presence (or absence) of a known watermark
in a received signal is assessed using a standard detection
statistic method: the correlation between the received signal
and the embedded message . This computation is supported
by experiments from Zeng and colleagues [17]. However,
recent work suggest that detectors based on the generalized
Gaussian distribution yield better detection results [5]. The
generic detection function is expressed as
When detection theory is applied to watermarking, one of two
hypotheses—the presence or the absence of a known water-
mark—is verified by comparing the output of to a threshold.
The latter is computed with respect to the system’s design (cost
functions, etc.). In the maximum-likelihood case, the normal-
ized threshold is equal to one half.
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Fig. 1. Original spectrum (normal line) and masking threshold (bold line) for sine waves at frequency 500 (left) and 5000 (right) Hz.
Fig. 2. Distribution of the normalized mask values for two DCT coefficient of the reference image “Girl”. The two coefficients are left (4,4) and right (4,7)
Measure of fidelity. Distortion is a scalar measure of the dif-
ference between two signals. The distortion between the original
and watermarked content is relevant to the watermarker while
the distortion between the attacked and original content is rel-
evant to the attacker. The distortion is usually computed using
one of two methods: 1) the standard SNR value, computed as the
sum of the squared differences or 2) a
perceptual distortion value, computed as an SNR value weighted
by a masking model so that regions of the signal where humans
are less sensitive to are little considered, and vice-versa. In the
present context, the perceptual distortion is defined by
(2)
If the original data was unaltered while if
the maximal allowable perceptual distortion (distortion “just”
not perceived) was introduced.
Measure of the effectiveness of an attack. An attack is con-
sidered efficient if it produces a significant decrease in the de-
tection statistic for a given perceptual distortion con-
straint. The effectiveness can be measured by normalizing the
difference in detection statistics before and after the attack, as
expressed by the variable :
(3)
If , the attacked image was unaltered and the water-
mark can be retrieved. If the attack was successful
and the watermark can not be retrieved, just as if it was re-
moved. Clearly, it is not exactly the case: in general, the de-
tection statistic drops severely at components significant to the
detection process and is little altered at the other components. In
the case of a maximum-likelihood detector the watermark would
be considered NOT present if .
B. The Mask Attack
In estimate-and-remove attacks, a weighting factor usually
controls the strength of the attack and can somewhat be con-
sidered as a measure of the introduced distortion. Instead of (or
in addition to) exploiting statistics on the signal as done with the
Wiener filter, the attacker can advantageously exploit of knowl-
edge on the mask and implement the mask attack. One way to
derive a theoretical framework for the latter is to find the rela-
tion between the mask and the attack’s efficiency.
A first, critical, assumption is that the mask is known to
the attacker. Since by definition, one could argue that the
mask of the watermarked content is a good approximation of
that of the original content: . This intuitive assump-
tion was previously used in the literature [5], [15]. To further val-
idate this assumption, Fig. 2 illustrates the correlation between
the mask of the original and watermarked content, for the DCT
coefficient (4,3) of the reference image “Girl” computed over
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6144 blocks of data; the value of the correlation factor is 0.91.
Computing the correlation factor for other coefficients yielded
similar values, crediting further the assumption. If is known
(deterministic), it can be considered as a constant when deriving
the statistics of . Hence, we have . The Wiener
estimate of the watermark is [6, p. 147]
(4)
The attack consists of subtracting the estimate of the watermark
from the watermarked content. Introducing a weight factor ,
the attack is defined by the following equations (for ):
(5)
The parameter represents the strength of the attack. It can be
related to the perceptual distortion constraint, as well as to the
expected reduction of detection statistic as shown next. Indeed
Thus, the expected , denoted , is
(6)
Now, let us derive the expected perceptual distortion for a given
. We note that
The expected perceptual distortion is
(7)
These results are also valid for binary messages: if follows
a binary equiprobable distribution , then
and it can be shown that the expected and the
expected will be equal to the found expressions.
Using , we can compute from (7) as
(8)
Fig. 3. Mask values for original versus watermarked images (“Girl”) for the
DCT coefficient (4,3).
Let us make a few comments. The parameter is a global at-
tack parameter and a constant scaling factor (over all dimen-
sions) set by the attacker. The mask , a vector, determines the
amount by which each of the dimensions can be modified.
Consequently is a vector that parameterizes the local attack
and indicates the amount by which the detection statistic will be
decreased in each of the dimension. The value of increases
with relative mask energy. Finally, the expected perceptual dis-
tortion is linked to the expected attack effectiveness by
the preceding equation in which is replaced by .
To illustrate the behavior of this equation (i.e., of the mask
attack), two graphs are shown in Fig. 3, for , 2, 3, 4: the
as a function of the normalized mask (top) and the ex-
pected detection statistic as a function of the normal-
ized mask (bottomt). It can be seen that: 1) the increases
with for a given value of the mask; 2) the increases with
the value of the mask—the attack is more efficient; 3) as the
value of the mask increases, the expected detection statistic first
increases, reaches a maximum and then decreases; and 4) when
considering the attack which introduces the smallest perceptual
distortion , the optimal value of the mask is ;
furthermore, considering a higher perceptual distortion value
for which the signal is still of reasonable quality, the
watermark should not be embedded in regions where the mask
value exceeds 0.5.
Three cases are of particular interest.
• Zero perceptual distortion attack.
If , the attacker does not introduce additional
perceptual distortion. The corresponding value of
is
(9)
In theory, the detection statistic can be decreased at little
or no cost by the attacker. This is confirmed by experi-
ments reported in Section III, where in some cases
is significantly reduced at no perceptual distortion cost.
Thus, it is suggested that the derivation of embedding
rules that consider the robustness parameter should take
into account the factor.
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• Approximation for small mask energy.
When (large ) the can be approxi-
mated by
and the mean reduction of detection statistic for an ex-
pected becomes
(10)
Therefore, the reduction in detection statistic is propor-
tional to the mean mask energy. This corresponds to the
linearization of the graph shown in Fig. 3 (top).
• Approximation for high mask energy—or small .
(11)
In some cases, the amount of energy that can be intro-
duced at given dimensions, using the mask, is significantly
higher than the energy of the host signal at those dimen-
sions; this is especially seen for sounds at higher frequen-
cies. Using masking models would lead us to believe that
the watermark would be more robust since “more signal
energy means better detection performance”. Conversely,
embedding the watermark in these specific dimensions
seems undesirable since the presence of the watermark is
no longer a secret when the mask is known. For example,
according to (11), can be greater than 2 (no distortion at-
tack), which means the detection statistic is strongly neg-
ative at these dimensions.
C. Comparison With the Wiener Attack
The Wiener attack, an estimate-and-remove attack, does
not take into consideration local values of the mask . The
single (yet strong) assumption of the Wiener attack is that
. Let us recall the attack
(12)
where is now a random variable (unknown). The value of
can not be adjusted to take into account local perceptual
distortion.
Let us compute the average perceptual distortion for
a given, fixed,
(13)
Clearly, . However, one can only obtain estimates for
and in which is a random variable. One
can still use the first order approximation, noting that it is only
valid when is small compared to , as follows:
(14)
where , since , , and are mutually indepen-
dent.
Assuming that (almost true), we find:
. Using this result with (14), we
obtain
(15)
(16)
Finally, by importing (15) and (16) in (13), one obtains
(17)
where is a measure for the spreading of mask values.
Note that the previous equation is only valid for values that
are small compared to ; hence, for a small . In that case, (17)
can be resolved for
(18)
A comparison with the Mask attack is possible for small mask
values, i.e., , in which case
. Recalling that the expected decrease in detection
statistic is equal to the parameter , we can
make a comparison with the Mask attack, using (10)
(19)
For varying from 0 to 0.5 ( to ), we note
that decreases from 1 to 0.85. Therefore, the following
conclusions can be drawn.
• It is not surprising that both the mask and the Wiener
attacks have the same result for a constant mask value
, since there is no point of locally adjusting the
attack in that case.
• As the mask values become more disperse, the Wiener
attack becomes decreasingly effective compared to the
mask attack, reaching a factor of 15% for . This
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Fig. 4. DDS versus the normalized mask (left), and the expected detection statistic (1  ) versus the normalized mask (right).
Fig. 5. Value of the DDS as function of the introduced perceptual (left) and absolute (right) distortions for the Wiener and masking attacks. Here  = 0:3,
 = 0; 3. Wiener attack: dashed line. Mask attack: solid line.
demonstrates how knowledge on the mask value allows a
better targeted attack.
• For higher values of , the first-order approximation
which was used is no longer validated and a higher order
approximation would be needed to readily compare the
two attacks. However, it is expected that the difference in
effectiveness between the two will increase: the Wiener
attack may result in higher perceptual distortions as the
mask value gets locally more unpredictable. The theoret-
ical simulations provided next confirm this intuition.
D. Simulations
1) Comparison Between Wiener and Mask Attacks: The
theoretical behavior of the mask attack can be simulated and
compared to the Wiener attacks, for different mask values. One
important characteristic is the decrease in detection statistic
as a function of the introduced perceptual distortion.
Artificial signals corresponding to hypotheses H1-H3 of (1)
are generated. Both perceptual and absolute (SNR) distortion
measures are computed. The simulations were conducted with
the values , , , which correspond
approximately to the average and standard deviation of the
normalized (with respect to ) coefficient (4,4) in the block
discrete cosine transform (DCT) of the three reference images.
Mask values below 0.1 yield artificially high perceptual distor-
tions for the Wiener attack and were rejected. The value of
was taken as a constant in the case of the Wiener case, and set
according to (8) in the case of the mask attack. The simulation
results are presented in Fig. 4.
Taking into account knowledge on the mask clearly yields
higher values, for any given distortion, than using the
Gaussian assumption on . Such a result must be taken in its
context: the watermarking techniques considered, the assump-
tions on the signals and so on.
2) Finding the Most Robust DCT Coefficients: Finding the
more robust DCT coefficients is motivated by two factors:
first, to better understand the dynamics of the mask attack, and
second to help derive new watermark embedding rules. The
procedure utilized here comprises several steps: 1) estimate
and for each DCT coefficient of the 8 8 matrix and aver-
aged over the three reference images—see Fig. 5; 2) generate
the signals , and , for each of the 100 000 simulation
runs, according to the average values given by the previous
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Fig. 6. Average values of over the three reference images. The indices u and
v refer to the spatial frequencies.
step; 3) compute the global detection statistic and the contri-
bution of each of the DCT coefficient to this value; 4) increase
until the value of reaches 0.5 and then 1, so that all
DCT coefficients that have a negative contribution to the detec-
tion statistic (therefore finding the maximal possible detection
statistic value) are removed; and 5) keep the set of the largest
DCT coefficients corresponding to 80% of the maximal pos-
sible detection statistic value. The value 80% was set arbitrarily
but serves as a good indication of which coefficient contribute
the most to the detection statistic.
The set of the DCT coefficients identified using the above
methodology is shown in Fig. 6. The two values of (0.5
and 1) in the experiment correspond to the threshold value of a
maximum-likelihood detection, and the value at which the de-
tection statistic is null.
A number of comments can be made: 1) high-frequency DCT
coefficients are robust to weak attacks while low-frequency co-
efficients are robust to stronger attacks; 2) considering the case
where the watermark should be embedded in all
coefficients, excluding the two or three coefficients at the ex-
trema; 3) considering the case where , the watermark
should be embedded in the first half of the DCT coefficients,
excluding the DC coefficient for obvious perceptual distortion
reasons; 4) the coefficients common to the two preceeding cases
form the diagonals three to six of the DCT block matrix; and
5) the first diagonals of the DCT matrix contribute little to the
detection statistic, but usually contribute much to perceptual dis-
tortions. This experiment confirms that middle frequencies form
the most suited region to embed the watermark, as indirectly
suggested in [5] and [17].
E. Conclusion
The use of a mask in watermarking gives valuable informa-
tion to the attacker on the location and eventually the strength
of the watermark. Taking realistic hypotheses, it is possible to
derive a theoretical relation between the decrease in detection
statistic and the introduced perceptual distortion; the former de-
pends mostly on the signal energy and the mask. A similar rela-
tion can be derived for the Wiener attack and, when comparing
the two, the theory shows that the mask attack can be more ef-
ficient. This is confirmed through simulations using generated
signals. Furthermore, for images, the use of the DCT coeffi-
cients in diagonals 3 to 6, suggested intuitively in previous lit-
erature, was validated by theoretical results. Also, it was con-
cluded that the watermark should not be embedded in dimen-
sions with high mask values, where knowledge on the mask is
very useful to the attacker. As a rule of thumb, embedding the
watermark in frequencies where the normalized mask values is
above 0.5 is not recommended. Once again, these conclusions
must be considered within the specified context and working
assumptions.
III. EXPERIMENTS ON REAL DATA
This section provides experimental results on the effective-
ness of the mask attack on real data—sounds and images. Ex-
periments are based on the theoretical framework laid in the pre-
vious section. The focus of these experiments is the decrease in
detection statistic as a function of the introduced per-
ceptual distortion.
A. Data
In order to represent the variety of characteristics found in
different sounds and images, a selection of three audio extracts
and three image representative samples was made.
1) “Handel”: extract from Handel’s Fireworks
2) “Emma”: extract from Emma Shapplin
3) “Song”: Torn from pop singer Natalie Imbruglia
• Audio (all 16 bits at 44.1 kHz, of ms in duration):
1) “Handel”: extract from Handel’s Fireworks
2) “Emma”: extract from Emma Shapplin
3) “Song”: Torn from pop singer Natalie Imbruglia
• Images:
1) “Benz”: synthetic image of an old Mercedes Benz
2) “Girl”: human face
3) “Mandrill”: chimpanzee with important contrast
Furthermore, for all experiments, the message is a pseudo-noise
sequence of arbitrary length—yet much greater than the size of
the host signal.
B. Attacks on Sounds
The reference audio watermarking technique utilized in these
experiments is that of Swanson and colleagues [14]; it makes
use of both a temporal (envelope-based) and a spectral masking
model. At the embedding process no energy is put into the first
ten (out of 256) spectral coefficients; this would induce impor-
tant perceptual distortion. Two cases are considered next: em-
bedding the watermark in all remaining spectral coefficients
(type I), or only in the first half (type II).
A trivial attack would be to low-pass filter the watermarked
signal at a cutoff frequency of 10 kHz or so: in high frequen-
cies, the global masking threshold suggests to embed significant
watermark energy but most audio samples have no meaningful
components there (see Fig. 12). Low-pass filtering significantly
decreases the detection statistic at a very low perceptual dis-
tortion cost. Not embedding watermark at high frequencies ob-
viously circumvents this attack but decreases considerably the
watermark payload. Experimental results are not reported here.
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Fig. 7. Ensemble of DCT coefficients which correspond to 80% of the
maximal possible detection statistic, after the mask attack. Normal lines:
DDS = 1, dashed lines: DDS = 0:5
Fig. 8. Mask for the three reference audio segments. The mask is normalized,
and computed as the average over all blocks.
A second attack would take advantage of the fact that tonal
components identified by the mask process remain unchanged
once the watermark is embedded (see Appendix). Knowledge
on tone identification process allows to wisely remove the water-
mark in the tonal regions at little perceptual distortion cost. We
do not foresee any trivial counter-measure other than computing
the tonal components differently or not embedding the water-
mark in such regions. Experimental results are not reported here.
The third suggested attack is the mask attack introduced in
Section II. The attacker’s challenge is to find the tradeoff be-
tween the decrease in detection statistic and the introduced per-
ceptual distortion.
The average normalized mask for the three reference audio
samples is shown in Fig. 7; the mask values were normalized
to the value of and averaged over all blocks. As a conse-
quence of the masking model properties, the mask values are
large in the high frequencies, as expected. The mask attack is
then perpetrated on the watermarked signals. The decrease in
detection statistic as a function of the introduced percep-
tual distortion is shown in Fig. 8. A perceptual distortion of 4
is not heard, but moving beyond this value results in noticeable
TABLE II
EMBEDDING DISTORTIONS FOR THE THREE REFERENCE SOUNDS WHEN THE
EMBEDDING WAS ON ALL COEFFICIENTS, OR WHEN ONLY THE FIRST
HALF WERE SELECTED
perceptual distortion. No values greater than unity are re-
ported since, at this value, the detection statistic is already null
(the received content contains no detectable watermark). The
shape of the mask in higher frequencies was already a strong
indication of the expected efficiency of the mask attack. Since
high frequencies contribute little to the perceptual distortion cost
and can be readily attacked, one could anticipate that type-I em-
bedding would be less robust than type-II embedding; this was
confirmed by the reported results.
For the samples “Handel” and “Emma” the value of
reaches unity for a low perceptual distortion cost while for the
sample “Song” much greater perceptual distortion is necessary
to obtain similar results. The mask attack was particularly ef-
fective on the sample “Handel” because mask values are out of
scale. Also, much higher watermark energy was embedded in
samples “Handel” and “Emma” than in “Song”, as reported in
Table II. The belief that “more watermark energy means better
robustness”, stated in a number of studies on robustness, sug-
gests that the robustness of the watermarks embedded in the first
two audio samples, since it has greater energy, would be greater
than that of the third sample. Yet the reported experiments, in
agreement with the theoretical framework of Section II, show
the opposite.
C. Attack on Images
The reference image watermarking technique utilized in the
experiments is that of Zeng and colleagues [17]. The watermark
is embedded in the DCT coefficients and the spectral contrast
masking model is computed. In order to take into consideration
different masking model implementations, two embedding pro-
cesses are considered: embedding the watermark only in diago-
nals four to six of the 8 8 DCT block (type I) and embedding
the watermark in all but the first three diagonals (type II).
The mask attack, taking into account a local estimation of ,
was successful on all reference images. The decrease in detec-
tion statistic is shown for different values of the intro-
duced perceptual distortion in Fig. 9.
Let us make a few comments, validated on all three reference
images: 1) for a reasonable perceptual distortion cost, the detec-
tion statistic is decreased to a point where the detector detects
no watermark: the mask attack is successful; 2) the detection
statistic can be made null even for reasonable introduced per-
ceptual distortion; 3) the masking attack is most efficient for the
Type-II embedding than for type I embedding; and 4) one can
find perceptual distortion values below 1 as described in (8). The
original, watermarked and attacked samples of “Girl” are shown
in Fig. 10 when using the type-I embedding; the perceptual dis-
tortion on the attacked image was equal to 2.7.
Perpetuating the mask attack on a series of images revealed
two visible artifacts, only when considering a close to
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Fig. 9. Experimental results: DDS versus introduced distortion for the three
reference sounds. Solid and dashed lines refer to Type-I and Type-II embedding,
respectively.
Fig. 10. Experimental results: DDS versus introduced distortion for the
three reference iamgess. Solid and dashed lines refer to Type-I and Type-II
embedding, respectively.
unity: 1) there is a blurring of the image, which can be cor-
rected using standard algorithms such as an asymmetric high-
pass filters and 2) one can observe a slight change in lumi-
nance; no simple correction is foreseen. This is particularly true
for the image “Mandrill” and can be partially explained by re-
sults shown in Fig. 9: the perceptual distortion is greatest for
this image when the is close to unity.
Contour plots of the set of DCT coefficients that contribute
to 80% of the maximal detection statistic value are shown in
Fig. 11 for each reference images. One can deduce from this
graph that the “best” general location for watermark embed-
ding, with respect to the mask attack, is the middle frequencies.
From our experiments we can conclude: a) little watermark en-
ergy should be embedded at low-frequencies because the intro-
duced perceptual distortion is important; b) considerable energy
can be embedded at high frequencies but the watermark can be
removed (and even “reversed”); therefore c) placing the water-
mark in the middle frequencies seems to optimize the tradeoff
between embedded energy, introduced distortion and robust-
ness. This result, based on experiments with real data, concurs
with the theoretically derived “optimal” embedding place (Sec-
tion II) and with insights given in [17].
D. Conclusions
Experiments on real data, considering additive watermarking
techniques using masking models, confirmed the theoretical cal-
culation of Section II: the mask attack successfully decreases
the detection statistic at a low perceptual distortion cost. Even
more so, the reeiver was sometimes unable to detect any trace of
the watermark. These results reasonably question the systematic
use of masking models in watermarking, and shed some light on
the design tradeoff between distortion and robustness.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Forgetting the Origin of Masking Models
The publicly available masking models utilized in water-
marking are inherited from data compression applications.
Using the same models to shape a watermark in order to have
maximal SNR while remaining imperceptible seems a rea-
sonably good strategy; we have however shown in this paper
that, in most cases, too much information on the watermark is
revealed to a potential attacker.
Masking models identify perceptually significant regions of
the signal—regions that should not be altered when embedding
the watermark. It is reasonable to assume that the mask of the
watermarked signal is very similar to the one of the original
signal (this assumption was validated in our experiments). In
other words, the attacker gains knowledge on the location of the
watermark by computing the mask of the watermarked signal.
Also, since masking models are usually derived locally (they are
computed over short data segments and are based on local prop-
erties of the signal) the attacker can target precise and confined
regions within the signal where high watermark energy can be
expected.
As our understanding of audio and image perception im-
proves and as the quest for higher data compression ratio
continues, masking models will become increasingly accurate
and will continue to improve. Two points are worth noting.
First, watermarking, which uses imperceptible regions of the
signal to hide information, will trail behind these increasingly
accurate masking models which, in turn, aim at defining regions
that are useless to the observer. For example, an ideal lossless
compression scheme would ensure perfect content fidelity and
leave no room to embed a watermark. Second, there is a legacy
issue: watermarks embedded using today’s state-of-the-art
masking models may be removed (or severely damaged) when
next-generation models are used to further compress existing
watermarked data.
Using masking models allows the embedding of high SNR
watermarks, especially in certain locations, while preserving the
fidelity of the watermarked content. While this a very attractive
strategy, one must not forget that it is the cover content that hides
the watermark; by allowing high SNRs in certain locations, the
watermark is no longer “hidden” in the content and therefore
becomes exposed and vulnerable to an attacker.
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Fig. 11. From left to right: original, watermarked, and attacked image.
B. The Efficiency of the Mask Attack
A number of successful attacks on watermarking systems
have been reported in the literature. This includes tailored
attacks against selected techniques, general attacks such as
cropping, scaling, distorting the data (i.e., Stirmark) and, more
recently, estimate and removal attacks—sometimes called copy
attacks [8], [15]. Although the assumptions on the signals are
not always clearly stated, these attacks are successful. This
paper introduced a new estimate-and-remove attack: the mask
attack.
The mask attack was shown to significantly decrease the
detection statistic for small perceptual distortion cost for
watermarking techniques that make use of publicly available
masking models. What makes the attack very effective is the
use of the knowledge on the mask (the mask of the original
and watermarked content are much correlated): not only does
the attacker gain privilege information on the most probable
location of the watermark, he can also locally evaluate its
strength in each dimension (each region). This enables a better
estimate of the watermark than, for example, when the Wiener
filter assumes a zero-mean, Gaussian distribution watermark.
In addition, the perceptual distortion introduced by attack can
be better controlled.
The mask attack was successful on audio and image data
alike. The results indicate that the watermark detection fails
(values of approach unity) for reasonable perceptual
distortion levels. The agnosticism of the attack to the different
masking methodology is not surprising since the working
assumptions are general enough to cope with both models con-
sidered in this study; in fact similar conclusions are expected
for any masking model. The mask attack was more successful
on images than on audio signals. This can be explained, in part,
by three factors: 1) audio coefficients in the transform domain
have much larger dynamics than their image counterpart; 2) in
audio, the number of coefficients that contributes to the detec-
tion statistic is large, conversely to the case of images in which
the contribution mostly comes from the middle frequency
coefficients; and 3) there was more watermark energy em-
bedded in audio than there was in images resulting in the mask
assumption— —being not as strongly validated.
C. The Fidelity-Robustness Tradeoff
The tradeoff between robustness and fidelity is not properly
addressed in the literature. On one hand, ad-hoc methods are
used to embed the watermark in regions where it will be both
transparent and “quite robust”. On the other hand, theoretically-
based techniques which are optimally robust with respect to
some criteria (function of the hypotheses used to derive them)
are usually based on a SNR distortion measure which does not
guarantee, in any way, transparency. Therefore, there seems to
be a missing theoretical link between robustness and distortion.
A key factor is finding the analytical expression of perceptual
distortion in relation to theoretical hypotheses on the signals.
The common belief that more watermark energy means more
robust watermark, often stated in the literature, was challenged
by the reported experiments on real data. For example, the belief
would be that the watermark embedded in the two audio samples
“Handel” and “Emma” be more robust than the one embedded
in the sample “Song” because more energy was embedded. Yet,
in agreement with the theoretical framework presented in Sec-
tion II, the opposite conclusion was verified. This shows that
a link between robustness and perceptual distortion must defi-
nitely be found.
Accordingly, a first step in that direction was suggested in this
paper: an analytical closed-form equation was found for the gen-
eral masking model and results derived on the effectiveness of
the mask attack. Theoretical simulations as well as experiments
on real data allowed to identify the set of dimensions which are
most robust to the attack. The mid-frequencies are best for im-
ages (see Fig. 7) while audio signals benefited from a watermark
spread over a larger number of dimensions (there is no specific
region for sounds as the variety of local energy with respect to
dimension is much more random than it is for images). This is
in agreement with ad-hoc suggested techniques [17].
A number of theoretical work and results giving priority to ro-
bustness exist. For example, given a SNR distortion constraint,
one can derive an optimal watermarking rule that minimizes the
detection error probability [12]. The tradeoff solution indicates
the watermark should be embedded in selected regions of the
signal for which the watermark to signal ratio will be optimized
at the detector, hence optimizing the detection statistic. There
is no guarantee of transparency. A masking model could even-
tually be used to assess if the introduced watermark is “too”
noticeable. An interesting fact in that framework is that the at-
tacker has no choice but to distort significantly the content in
order to remove the watermark. Other similar methods are pre-
sented in [4], [13]. These work could likely integrate perceptual
distortion measures to better take into account the fidelity aspect
of watermarking.
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V. CONCLUSION
Watermarking is a tradeoff between fidelity, robustness, and
payload. The relation between the last two parameters has been
studied in previous literature and solutions have been suggested.
Fidelity is often attained by using masking models, but, when
doing so, this papers shows that not considering robustness al-
lows the attacker to benefit from key information on the location
and strength of the watermark. The end result is the derivation of
the mask attack. Let us conclude with the following comments.
• Masking models were introduced in data compres-
sion to shape the quantization noise—a meaningless
signal. The consequence of using such models in water-
marking to control perceptible distortion when shaping
the embedded watermark, a meaningful and potentially
vulnerable signal, was not studied so far. The scope of the
paper was to link the usage of a mask with the system’s
robustness.
• The mask attack makes use of global and local knowledge
on the signals, or perceptual properties deduced from the
masking models, to estimate and remove the embedded
watermark. The mask attack is derived from a theoretical
framework whose main battle ground lies in the relation
between the decrease in detection statistic and the intro-
duced perceptual distortion. Theoretical simulations and
experiments on real data successfully demonstrated the
efficiency of the attack for audio and images alike; the
attack was shown more efficient than the Wiener attack
in most cases. To best counteract the mask attack, image
watermarks should be embedded in the middle frequen-
cies (when the DCT transform is used). For audio signals,
however, the only conclusion was to avoid high frequen-
cies and dominant tonal components.
• Embedding a robust, imperceptible watermark that carries
a lot of information is indeed quite a challenge. There is a
need for theoretical grounds to derive analytical tradeoff
equations that globally take into accounts all three param-
eters robustness, capacity and fidelity. The authors hope to
have achieved a first step in that direction here. However,
given the variety of application scenarios and attacks, the
numerous types of watermarking methods, and the diffi-
culty to determine “objective” perceptual models and dis-
tances, many other research avenues are possible.
APPENDIX
MASKING MODELS FOR SOUNDS AND IMAGES
This appendix describes the masking models most commonly
used in audio and image watermarking, and specifically used in
reference techniques in Section III. This should not be regarded
as a tutorial and references are given for further reading.
A. The Mask
The mask is a matrix of values computed on individual pro-
cessing blocks; it modulates a typical white spectrum watermark
at the embedding process. In its simplest form, the mask is the
identity matrix multiplied by a small constant; the watermark is
spread over the entire transform domain but has very small en-
ergy: its detection is impaired by any small modification to the
signal. Using a slightly more sophisticated mask, the watermark
would be selectively embeded in particular regions in the trans-
form domain (the energy of the watermark in that region can
be large), and put as “zero” elsewhere (the mask has the null
values); taking the example of images, the watermark could be
embedded only in spectral regions where the values of the DCT
coefficients are above a given threshold.
Watermarking techniques usually make use of much more
sophisticated masks, adapted from data compression applica-
tions and based on findings on our hearing or visual systems.
The mask identifies regions of the signal that are not perceived
when in presence of the main stimulus (the sound or the image);
these regions may correspond to temporal windows or spectral
intervals, depending on the masking model. Typicaly, masks are
computed on individual processing blocks of 20 milliseconds
for audio samples, and 8 8 pixels for images. Considering an
additive watermarking scheme, a mask is computed for each
successive blocks and used to modulate the watermark. This
method ensures that the embedded watermark be transparent
(not perceived).
B. Audio Masking Model
After years of perceptual experiments on humans and golden
ears, the MPEG group has developed the reference temporal
and spectral audio masking models. They are use in the MPEG
compression algorithms [2], [3].
The temporal audio masking model identifies temporal win-
dows, before and after the occurrence of a tonal stimuli, within
which no other tone (and more generally no other stimuli) of
lower intensity can be heard. The pre-echo (before the tonal
stimuli) and the post echo (after the tonal stimuli) can be mod-
eled respectively as rising and falling exponentials with dif-
ferent time constants. One can approximate the MPEG model
by computing the short term amplitude envelope of the original
signal. In a first watermarking technique exploiting the temporal
masking, artificial echoes are added within the original signal
at the appropriate time and retrieved at the receiver side since
their timing is known [1]. Because of the predictability of the
scheme a tailored attack was soon suggested [10]. In a second
technique based on temporal masks, the short-term envelope of
the original signal modulates the watermark [14]; one advantage
of this technique is that no watermark is embedded into silence
segments.
The spectral audio masking model is based on the following
observation: in presence of a tone at frequency , humans do not
hear tones at frequencies below and above if their intensity
level is below a masking threshold. The shape of this threshold
function was determined by perceptual experiments using tonal
stimuli; additional experiments with noise were also conducted
for wider spectrum stimuli. The spectral mask must be com-
puted on segments of audio signals which can be considered as
stationary, typically 20–30 ms. Spectal masking thresholds for
tones at 500 (left) and 5000 (right) Hz are illustrated in Fig. 12.
The most widely used spectral masking model is computed ac-
cording to the following steps (detailed in [14]):
1) divide the audio signal into nonoverlapping segments of
20 ms in duration; then, for each segment;
2) compute the short-term power spectrum;
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Fig. 12. Contour plots of the ensemble of DCT coefficients which contribute to 80% of the maximal detection statistic value at the receiver, for the three reference
images. Indexes u and v correspond to the spatial frequencies. Left: DDS = 0:5. Right: DDS = 1.
3) identify the tonal (pure tones) and nontonal (noise) com-
ponents;
4) remove the masked components, including all sounds
below the absolute hearing threshold and those tonal
components that are too close to one another;
5) compute the individual masking thresholds, by ac-
counting for the frequency masking effects of the
auditory system;
6) deduce the global masking threshold, which is function of
the individual and of the absolute ones;
7) repeat from step 2.
As shown in Fig. 12, the masked region is usually signifi-
cant. As most implementations see the watermark embedded at
3–6 dB below the global masking threshold, to guarantee “com-
plete” inaudibility of the watermark, the WSR (watermark to
signal ratio) is usually high. Yet, the spectral masking model
was not designed for use in watermarking applications leading
to inherent drawbacks if the model is used as such. For example
the high mask values at high frequencies enables effective tai-
lored attacks, as shown in Section III.
C. Image Masking Model
Image masking models also result from perceptual studies
and from our understanding of the human visual system—better
known than the hearing system. Both spatial (pixel) and trans-
form (DFT, wavelet) domain masking models were proposed in
the literature.
Spatial image masking models rely on two independent
observations. First, as humans unequally detect changes in
colors, primary colors can be altered (watermarked) differently;
for example, a high energy watermark can be embedded in the
blue channel of an RGB image with little perceptual distortion
since humans are significantly less sensitive to changes in that
channel. Second, exploiting image contrast properties, one can
embed a watermark in regions where there are large changes
in color gradients. This method, conversely to the first, is
image-dependent. Both these models have been exploited in
image watermarking techniques [7], [11].
Spectral image masking models have also been developed
based on a block-wise (usually 8 8 pixels) decomposition of
the image. In the first approach the transform coefficients with
the least significant contributions (usually those with smallest
value) were retained to embed the watermark according to the
following rule in the transform domain: . The
coefficient may be a constant, or be dependent on the coef-
ficient’s position, or value. Later on, the frequency sensibility
was taken into account according to the modulation transfer
functions reported at the human visual system level. These
functions describe the sensitivity of our eyes to sine waves of
different energy and spectral location. From these modulation
functions, given the viewing distance, one may determine the
just noticeable difference-JND threshold at each frequency bin.
These thresholds serve both quantization and bit-allocation
purposes in compression algorithms. The resulting masking
model is image independent.
Two refinements using image dependent information im-
proved spectral masking. First, luminance sensitivity—or
the ability of the eye to detect noise on an uniform back-
ground—strongly depends on the average luminance of the
image and that of the noise. The spectral mask can be re-ad-
justed by computing the ratio between local luminance values
(estimated by the DC coefficient of each block) and the average
luminance of the image (the average of all DC coefficients).
Second, contrast sensitivity—or the detectibility of an image
component in presence of another component—is strongest
when the two components have similar frequency, location and
orientation. The contrast masking allows to take into account
our particular perception of the high frequencies and the texture
regions of the image.
The widely used image spectral masking model is determined
by computing the following steps:
1) divide the image into blocks of 8 8 pixels;
2) for each block, compute the spectral coefficients in the
luminance domain;
3) for each block, compute the threshold values
given for example by the difference between the value
of the spectral coefficients of the original image and the
image compressed with JPEG at a quality factor of 75;
4) compute the luminance sensitivity
where is the DC coefficient and
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is a parameter which controls the degree of luminance
sensitivity, usually taken as 0.649;
5) compute the contrast masking threshold (re-
ferred to as the JND) as:
, where
and is typically taken as 0.7.
This model, as well as others, are detailed in [16] and [17].
In most image watermarking implementations, the embedding
is limited to spectral coefficients in the middle frequencies.
Changes in the DC component would cause significant artifacts,
and high frequencies are subject to drastic manipulations from
standard compression algorithms.
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